




The Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM), once an
oddity in the residential mortgage industry, now
commands a majorshare ofnewmortgage origi-
nations. In the first quarterof 1984, for example,
ARMs ofvarious types represented over 60 percent
ofhomemortgages originated by banks, savings
and loanassociations and otherinstitutionallend-
ers. Some real estate analysts predictthat in afew
years the traditional, fixed-rate mortgage (FRM)
will be the oddity, representing onlyten orfifteen
percentofneworiginations.
This Letter examines the adjustable rate mortgage
trend and evaluates its effect on both the lending
industry and the housing sector in general. We find
thatalthough the ARMis an importantaddition to
theexistingarrayofmortgage instruments, itis not
likelytobe thesalvation ofthelendingand housing
industries that it is sometimes professed to be.
The ARM
An adjustable rate mortgage is simply a mortgage
instrumentthat provides for periodic adjustment
ofthecontractinterestrate. Atcontractuallyspeci-
fied intervals,anewmonthlypaymentis computed
usingthe remainingprincipal, the revised contract
rate, andthe remaininglifeofthe mortgage. In the
purestformoftheARM, theadjustmentand recom-
putationofthe paymentoccurveryfrequentlyand
the adjustments in the contract rate are tied to
movements in a short-term market rate. Such an
instrument has a value in the marketplace depen-
dentonly upon the outstanding principal ofthe
loan and thus can be considered free of interest-
rate risk to the holderofsuch debt.
The characteristics ofthis "pure" ARM contrasts
with an FRM (fixed rate mortgage)which, byvirtue
of its fixed contract rate and payment, will have a
value in the secondary marketthat depends upon
ambient interest rate conditions. It is, ofcourse,
this feature ofthe FRM that caused so much diffi-
cultyfor mortgage lenders duringthe 1970sand
early 1980swhen interest rates rose sharply and
unexpectedlyanddrovedowntheimplicitmarket
value ofthe mortgage loan portfolios ofmost
lenders.
To "immunize" or not
The rise in mortgage rates drewthe lenders' atten-
tion to the ARM because the instrumentoffered
the prospectof"immunizing"the lender's port-
folio from interest rate risk. A portfolioconsisting
ofadjustable rate mortgage assets and short-term
liabilitieswould notbe subjecttofluctuations in
networththatresuItfrom fluctuating interestrates.
Although perfect immunization is possible with
ARMs in concept, there are a numberofreasons
that interest rate risk considerations alone are un-
likelytoencourage the mortgage marketto make
"pure" ARMs the predominantform ofmortgage
instrumentation.
First, withaperfectly immunizedportfolio, alender
is implicitlyabandoningoneofthemajorfunctions
ofafinancial intermediary: interest rate intermedi-
ation-thefundingoffixed rate loans with short-
term liabilities. Presumably, institutional lenders
haveperformedthisfunction becausetheyenjoya
comparative advantage over households in doing
so. They have superior access, forexample, to
financial expertise and to mechanisms such as
futures marketstomanagetheirrisk-taking. Ifbanks
and savings and loan associations abandon this
function, they may lose the marketto some other
form ofinstitutional lender.
Putdifferently, because borrowerscannotmanage
interest rate risk as cost-effectively as lenders,
lendersare likelytofindthatpureARMs are attrac-
tivetoborrowers only at implicityields that are
lower(after adjustingfor risk) than those enjoyed
on fixed rate instruments. This observation appears
to be borneout bythe available data on the char-
acteristics ofthe ARMs. For example, mostofthe
ARMs issued are actually hybrids of FRMs and
ARMs, with interest rateand payment "caps" that
implicitlyreintroducesome interestrate risktothe
lender. Apparently, pure ARMs appearto have
been difficultto market.
Default risk tradeoff
The second reason thatthe marketshare ofARMs
probablywill be limited is the likelihood that
"adverse-selection" processes wiII maketheARM
borrower more likelytodefauItthan the FRM bor"
rower. This problem arises becauseARMs probably
are mostattractive to borrowers who believethat
interestrates have peaked and are likelytodeclineFRBSF
overthe remaining life ofthe instrument. These
same borrowers are likelyto have structured their
otherfinancial affairs in a mannerconsistentwith
thisexpectation. Thus, ifinterestrates rise (contrary
to these borrowers' expectations), they may be
pushed intodefault.
This notion, too, is consistent with the available
data. Present default rates on ARMs are about40
percent higherthan for FRMs ofsimilar value
issued in recent years. In addition, private mort-
gage insurance corporations charge a higher pre-
mium on ARMs than on FRMs and often will not
insure the "pure" ARMs atall.
ARMs and "affordability"
Risk considerations are notthe only determinants
ofthe ultimate marketabilityofARMs. One alleged
advantage ofthe ARM overthe FRM is that it
relaxes the "affordability" constraintfacing bor-
rowers, thereby perlTlittinghome purchases when
the characteristics ofthe household or market
conditions normally would not.
Theaffordabilityconstraihtappliestothe reiation-
ship between mortgage payments and family in-
come. In recent years, as interest rates and home
prices have risen, the mortgage payment on an
average newly purchased home has risen faster
than income. Since the payment/income ratio is
oneoftheunderwritingcriteriathat lendersemploy
in qualifying borrowers for mortgage loans, it is
argued that an increasing numberoffamilies find
themselves unabletoqualifyfor homefinancing.
The ARM is claimed to provide relieffrom the
affordabilityconstraint since its initial contract rate
is lowerthan thatofthe conventional FRM, making
the initial (orqualifying) payment also lower.
It is notclearthatthe method ofhousingfinance
has anything buta transienteffecton the "afford-
ability" ofhousing. Housing prices have risen rel-
ativetopricesofothergoods and services in recent
years primarily because ofgrowingdemand in an
environmentofland use controlsandotherdevel-
opmental restrictions that have prevented supply
from keeping pacewithdemand. In such amarket,
financing constraints would reduce housing de-
mand and prices and thereby partially offsetthe
effectofthe financing constraint. Mechanisms,
such as ARMs, that provide reiieffrom affordabiIity
constraints, are self-defeating since the reliefthey
providecouId becapitalized intostill higherhome
prices. For example, housing economistJames
Follain has argued thatthe home price boom of
the 1970s was partly initiated bythe relaxation of
the affordability constraintcaused bythe inclusion
ofspousal income in calculatingthe payment/
income ratio.
ARMs and.the housingcycle
Although ARMs arethus unlikelyto improve long~
term housingaffordability, theymayproviderelief
at peaks ofthe interest rate cycle, offeringthe
prospectofa less erratic housing investmentcycle.
The relationshipbetween interestrates and housing
starts is complex(see Chart 1). Research conducted
at the San Francisco Reserve Bank suggests that
the level ofhousingstarts is relatively insensitive
tothetrend level ofinterestrates butreacts signifi-
caiitlyto interest rate"shocks";·(Inparticular,we
find thatthe steady-state level ofhousing starts is
approximately 1.6 million units annually butthat
each sudden onepercentagepointrise in long-term
interest rates causes atransient reduction ofabout
250,000 units on an annual basis.) This phenom-
enon is consistentwith the notion that affordability
isofgreatercyclical than secularconcern. Thus, if
theavailabilityofARMs providesaffordablefinan-
cing during interest rate peaks, it is possible that
ARMs smooth outthe housing cycle.
Unfortunately, we have had too littleexperience
with ARMs todeterminetheir effecton the housing
cycleconclusively. ThedataontheshareofARMs
among home mortgages is consistentwith the no-
tion that ARMs can reiieve cyclical affordabiIity
problems forthe homebuyer. AsChart2 indicates,
the ARM share rises sharply when interest rates
rise abovetrend andfalls sharplythereafter. How-
ever, the size ofthe swings in recent housing start
cycles is notstatisticallydifferent(aftercontrollingChart 1 Chart 2
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fortheeffectofinterestrate andgeneral economic
conditions) from those ofearlier periods when
ARMs were notavailable. This suggests thatduring
periods ofpositive interest rate shocks, borrowers
who would have used FRMs simplyuse ARMs
instead, gamblingon asubsequentdeclinein rates.
industriesthat they are sometimes thoughtto be.
However, theydoprovideamechanism fortailor-
ing the interest-rate risk characteristics of lender
and household portfolios, and theydoprovidethe
mortgage marketwith an additional mechanism
forcopingwith a world ofvolatile and uncertain
interest rates.
In summary, ARMs appearto be something less
than the panacea forthe lendingand housing RandallJ.Pozdena
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of San
francisco, orof the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed tothe editor(Gregory Tong) or totheauthor....Free copiesof Federal Reserve publications
can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone(415) 974-2246.BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT














uo~6U!4S0m 4o~n U060JO OpOA0U








Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 182,932 442 6,907 5.3
Loans and Leases1 6 163,971 523 8,616 7.5
Commercial and Industrial 48,939 286 2,976 8.8
Real estate 60,947 39 2,048 4.7
Loan's to Individuals 29,911 177 3,260 16.7
Leases 5,050 3 - 13 - 0.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,787 - 89 - 720 - 7.8
OtherSecurities2 7,175 10 - 988 - 16.5
Total Deposits 188,986 -4,012 - 2,011 - 1.4
Demand Deposits 44,007 -3,165 - 5,230 - 14.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,021 - 275 - 2,310 - 10.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,170 - 474 - 605 - 6.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 132,808 - 374 3,823 4.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 37,671 - 314 - 1,926 - 6.6
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000ormore 40,888 - 232 2,723 09.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,915 - 8 - 1,092 - 6.4
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Exclucles U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately